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SITUATION

I

NEUTRALITY AND AIRCRAFT
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
(a) A dirigible, belonging to the air forces of the
State X, arrives at a commercial airport of State Z, and
the commander requests that the hydrogen, with which
it is filled, be replaced by helium, purchased before the
'var, but in storage undelivered at the airport.
'Vhat reply should the government of State Z give~
(b) A naval aircraft of State X of the largest seaplane type is forced down from mechanical causes in
the open sea off the coast of State Z. Help is requested
and the plane is to,ved by a local vessel to safe nloorings within harbor of Z. In the quiet ·waters of the
harbor, the cre'v effect necessary repairs in 24 hours,
and the commanding officer requests permission to
proceed.
'Vhat reply should the government of State Z give~
SOLUTION

(a) The govern1nent of State Z should deny the request of the commander of the dirigible of the air forces
of State X to replace the hydrogen by helium.
(b) The government o£ State Z should intern the
seaplane and its personnel.
Definitions.-Aircraft as used in air navigation in the
Panama Canal Zone is defined as "any contrivance now
known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for na vigation of or flight in the air, except a parachute or other
contrivance designed for such navigation but used primarily as safety equipment." (Regulations to Govern
1

2

NEUTHALITY AND AIRCRAFT

Air Navigation in the Canal Zone, Septr1nber 22, 1931,.
sec. 11 and Appendix 2.)
Air space is " construed to mean the air vertically oYerlying any area that Inay be designated," and " The Panama Canal Zone including the ' three-mile limit'" 'vas
designated in 1926 " to be a ~lilitary Airspace Reservation." (44 U. S. Stat. 568.)
B,arly ?'egulation of aerial navigation.-\\Thile there
have been advocates of the doctrine of freedon1 of the
air, in practice, states ha Ye tended to regulate the usc
of superjacent space by aircraft. Early regulations
'vere 1nainly of the nature of national police control to
prevent da1nage to property and persons by balloons.
For n1any years, aerial navigation 'vas for the most part
a spectacular experi1nent involving risks against 'vhich
each state endeavored to provide. National regulation
therefore preceded international.
Discussion of international regulations was carried on
before long-range flights 'vere C0Illn10ll. rrhe . Institute
of International La,v at its session in Ghent in 1906
adopted in its proposed international regulation of
wireless telegraphy as "Article 1. The air is free.
States have over it, in tin1e of peace and in time of 'var,
only the rights necessary for their preservation." Subsequent study by the institute 1naterially changed the
point of vie'v and at the 1neeting at ~fadrid in 1911 an
article on the legal status of aircraft 'vas adopted as
:follows:
3. International aerial eirculation is free, saYing the right
of subjacent States to take certain measures, to be detennined,
to ensure their owi1 security nnd that of the persons and property of their inhabitants. (Resolutions of the Institute of
International Law, Carnegie IDndown1ent for International Peace,
p. 171.)

Institute of International Law, 1927.-,.The institute
at the session of 1927 at Lausanne adopted, after discussion o:f the conflicting theories of the sovereignty and
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o£ the £reedon1 o£ the air, the £ollo,ving as a proposed
regulation of aerial navigation:
Art. 1. Il [l ppartien t a ch[lque ~~tate de regler l'usage de l'air
au-dessus de son territorie, en tenant compte d'une })art des
neeessites de la circulation aerienne internationale ( atterrissage
compris), d'autre part, des necessites de la securite nationale,
t[lnt au point de yue 1nilitaire, douanier, sanitaire, qu'au point de
Yue de la protection des personnes et des biens de ses habitants.
Art. 3. N'ont pas droit au regime de libre circulation interIta tiouale, les aeronefs affectes au serYice de la puiss[lnce publique d'un Etn t et les aeronefs faisant partie du materiel de
guerre <l'un Etat ou commnnde p[lr un militaire commissionne
a cet effect. (3~ Annuaire, Institut de Droit International, vol.
3, l1P. 337' 338.)

Later regula.tions.-'I'he freedon1 of aerial navigation 'Yas not generally accepted, ho,Yever, and states
n1ade regulations restricting the use both of national
and foreign aircraft. Soinetiines, even, the regulations of adjoining subcliYisions of a state ·were not in
confonnity. The conYention relating to the regulation
of air navigation, signed at Paris, October 13, 1919,
states:
Art. 1. The high contracting parties recognize that every power
bas complete aud exclusive sovereignty over the air space above
its territory.
For the tnnpose of the vresent convention the territory of
a state shall be understood as including the nationnl territory,
both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the
territorial waters adjacent thereto. (1929, Kaval \Var College, International La\v Situatious, p. 26.)

'fhe sa1ne· principle ",.as affirmed at Havana in 1928
in the conYention on commercial avjation.
National and international rules for regjstration, indenlnification, flight, landing, etc., have rapidly deYeloped. GoYernn1ent control has been easy because
states seeking to do1ninate or lead in aviation have 'villingly granted subsidies to con1panies engaged both ]n
1nanufactnre and operation of aircraft. France seen1s
to have increased subsidies so that the an1ount for 1929
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'vas n1ore than one hundred times the amount o:f 1919.
Other states have :follo·wed varying syste1ns of aiding
private or quasi-private companies and there are differing opinions as to the merits of the respective systems.
0 onditions of registration.-The conditions of registration vary and may in some instances determine the
treatn1ent to which an aircraft is liable in a :foreign state
whether that state be belligerent or neutral. In the case
of the Panama Canal Zone certain prerequisites condition licensing and registration.
1. An aircraft, to be entitled to license and registry, must be
airworthy and equipped in accordance 'vith the requirements of
the Canal Zone and owned by
(a) A citizen of the United States.
(b) The Government of the United States, a State, Territory,
or possession, or a political subdivision thereof.

Undoubtedly war would be a " time o:f emergency "
and it would be difficult :for a neutral to deter1nine long
in advance ho'v a modern machine like a private aircraft even thus registered should be treated. An aircraft
of an enemy at the outbreak o:f war in a belligerent
state 1night be seized and such an aircraft subsequently
entering belligerent jurisdiction would be likewise
seized.
Communication by air.-Whatever the differences of
opinion in regard to the systems and regulation of aerial
communication, there is no difference of opinion as to
the present necessity of such co1n1nunication both in
time of peace and in time of war. While .in the early
stages of the development of aerial communication states
viewed with comparative indifference the use of the superjacent air, now this use is in many states jealously
guarded as would be a railway right o:f way across its
territory, and :foreign airlines are in general under restrictions prescribed in article 15 of the convention o:f
1919 which provides that " The establishment of international air,vays should be subject to the consent of the
states flo,vn over." In some respects the slogan ":free-
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do1n of the seas" is being super~eded by the slogan
~~ fredom of the air," but is n1eeting with little approvaL
Indirect limitation on aircraft.-While there may in
some states be no direct limitation upon the use or number of foreign aircraft within their territorial jurisdiction, indirect limitation 1nay arise through rules requiring landing at certain places, etc., in the time of peacer
Naval powers have also been limited indirectly by conYentions such as the Washington Convention of 1922 prescribing the character and the use of naval vessels as air-·
craft carriers.
Procla1nation regarding Pana1na, 191,4.-0ne of the·
earliest statements made by the United States in regard
to aircraft was in the proclamation of November 13,.
1914, concerning the neutrality of the Panama Canal
Zone. 'Vhile the prea1nble states that the United Statesexercises sovereignty in the land and 'vaters of the zone,.
the articles assume the right to exercise authority in.
the superjacent air.
\Vhereas the United States is neutral in the present war and'
whereas the United States exercises sovereignty in the land and.
\Vaters of the Canal Zone and is authorized by its treaty with
Panama of February 26, 1904, to maintain neutrality in the cities
of Panama and Colon, and the harbors adjacent to the said
cities: * * *
Rule 15.-Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are·
forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United
States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above
the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.
Rule 16.-For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includesthe cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the
~aiel cities.
(1915, Naval "Tar College, International Law Topicsr
p. 11.)

Limitation, treaty of Versailles, 191t9.-Part V of the
treaty of Versailles, 1919, has as its introductory clause:
In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly
to. observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.
(1919, Naval \Vur College, International Law Documents, p. 70.)
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In carrying out this purpose, article 1D8 prescribed
that "rfhe ar1ned forces of Gern1any 1nust not include
any n1ilitary or naYal air forces.''
Other articles to re1nain in force till Jan nary 1 ~ 1923,
unless Ger1nany hacl preYiously becon1e a Ineinber of
the fa1nily of nations, gave the ...\llied ancl Associated
Po,Yers privileges si1nilar to those of German aircraft.
Article 313. '.rile aircraft of tlle Allied and Associated Po,yers
shall haYe full liberty of pa~~age mHl landing oYer and in the
territory and territorial waters of Gernwu~·. an(1 shall enjo;"· the
same priYileges as German aircraft. 1mrticularly in ea~e of
distress by land ancl sea.
Article 314. The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers
shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy
the right of flying oYer the territory and territorial waters of
Germany without landing, subject ahYays to any regulations
which may be made by Germany, and which shall be applicable
equally to the aircraft of Gern1any and to those of the Allied
and Associated countries.
Article 315. All aerodromes in Germany open to national public
traftk shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated
Powers, and in any such aerodron1e such aircraft shall be treated
on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges
of eYery description, including charges for landing and accommodation. (Ibid, p. 156.)

These li1nitations 'Yere not :. . uch as the Allied Po·wers
"·oulcl propose as the basis for general regulations to
prevail an1ong the1nselves. Incleecl .. the Allied Po,vers
'Yould probably not "·ish such regulations to prevail
even for the1nselves after nor1nal relations 'vere reestablished as geographical ancl other conditions n1ight
giYe unequal advantages to so1ne of their nun1ber.
La-ws of the United ~'tates.-By an act of ~fay 20, 1926,
the use of aircraft 'Yas prescribed and it w,.as stated
that'J:1he Cougress herebr declares that the GoYenunent of the
United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete soyereignty of the air~vace oyer the l:uu1R a n<l \Yn ter:-:
of the United States, including the Canal Zone. Aircraft a part
of tbc anned forces of any foreign nation shall not be navigated
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in the ruited States, including the Canal Zone. except in accordanee ''"ith un autlwrizntion granted by. the Secretary of State.
( -!-! r. S. Stat. 572.)

Definitions of tern1s used in the act ,yere given and
son1e of these have been einbocliecl in treaties, regulations, etc.
P1'olzibited carriage.-By Executive order of February 18, 1D2D, issued in accordance 'Yith the act of August
2±~ 1D12 (37 U. S. Stat. 560) :
a. The carriage hy vriYate nircraft of arms and Inunitions of
war, anll of snch nrticles a~ are or may be prohibited by law and
regulations of tlle Unitell State~ in force· in the Panama Canal
~one or of the State in whic-h the aircraft is registered is prohibited.
b. E::qn'ess license and authority must be procured from authorized Panama Canal Zone offic-ial:-.: for the carriage in private ·aircraft of arms for hunting or protection of crew and cargo,
commercial explosiYes, vhotogrnvhic apparatus not boxed and
scaled, and such other articles as the GoYernor of the Panama
Canal may prescribe.

Ilcgulations in genera.1.-It is no\Y generally achnittecl
that regulations for the use of aircraft 1nay have some
analogies to the regulations for the use of naval craft:
yet aerial navigation is £o unlike 1nariti1ne navigation
that analogies are often \.,.ery 1nisleacling. The tin1e eleInent in the use of aircraft as "·ell as the space ele1nent
is, in 1nany respects~ unlike that in the use of naval craft.
The increased range of vision introduces other problen1s
\Yhich have led to propo~ition~ to extend the aerial zone
beyond the co1nn1only accepted 3-Inile 1naritime zone of
j uriscliction.
rfhere \YOUld still re1nain Certain problenlS as to using
higher aerial zones along the frontier of aclj a cent states.
In any case it is recognized that there are differences in
the nature of the use of the air over land and over territorial "~aters.
Oo1n1nission of Ju1·ists, 1923.-The use of higher aerial
zones at sea 'vas one of the n1atters under consideration
by the Commission of ~Jurists to consider and report

8

NEUTRALITY AND AIRCRAFT

upon the l{evision of the Rules of ''Tarfare at 'fhe
Hague in 1923. The Italian delegate particularly advocated a 10-Inile national jurisdiction for aerial purposes while not proposing a change in 1naritime jurisdiction. The commission did not regard the proposal as
practicable, calling attention to the case in 'vhich a
neutral state, which maintained the 3-mile limit of
1naritime jurisdiction, might desire to take action against
a belligerent hydroplane flying "\vithin 10 miles of the
.coast but over the high geas. The hydroplane might
alight and at once be outside neutral jurisdiction and on
the high seas. The report of the commission said:
On principle it would seem that the jurisdiction in the air·S pace should be appurtenant to the territorial jurisdiction enjo~·ed
.beneath it, and that in the absence of a territorial jurisdiction
,beneath, there is no sound basis for jurisdiction in the air.
Furthermore, it is felt that the obligation to enforce respect
for neutral rights throughout a 10-mile belt would impose an
increased burden on neutral Powers without adequate compen.sating advantages. Even with this wider belt it would still be
easy for airmen fighting in the air to lose their bearings in the
heat of the combat, and to encroach inadvertently on neutral
_jurisdiction. Lastly, the greater the distance from the coast, the
more difficult it is for the position of an aircraft to be determined
with precision, and the more frequent, therefore, will disputes
become between belligerent and neutral States as to violation by
the former's aircraft of the latter's jurisdiction. (1924, Na ,·al
War College, International Law Documents, p. 152.)

The Italian delegation while renouncing further im_m ediate consideration of the proposition states that1. It does not think it desirable to resun1e in Plenary Commission the discussion of a question which has on several occasions been considered in all the necessary detail during the meetings of the Sub-Comn1ittee.
2. Nevertheless, although the 1najority of the Delegations ha,·e
already put forward views opposed to it~ proposal, it continues
to believe in the importance of that proposal and in the necessity
for its adoption and insertion in an international convention.
3. Frmn the pDint of Yiew both of belligerent and of neutral
.States, their are reasons of the highest juridicial and tef'hnieal
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iinportance which make it indispensable to allow each State th~
vower of including in its jurisdiction the atmospheric space to a
distance of 10 miles from its coast.
4. The difficulties resulting from the difference between the
width of the marginal air-belt and the width of national territorial waters would not seem to be so ser· ous as to render the
Italian proposal unacceptable in practice.
5. In any case, there is no juridical obstacle to the fixing of
the same width of space for the marginal air-belt as for territorial waters, the Italian Delegation being of opinion that international law, as generally recognised, contains no rule prohibiting a State from extending its territorial waters to a distance
<>f 10 sea-miles from its coasts.
6. In conclusion, it urges that a question of such paramount
importance should be reopened and placed upon the agenda of a
<!onference in the near future. (Ibid, p. 153.)

League of Nations Oommission.-The League of
Nations Preparatory Commission :for the Disarmament
Conference considered the question o:f limitation o:f air
ar1na1nent :fro1n time to time. There seemed to be a
general opinion that civil aircraft would play a very
itnportant part in any 'var that 1night arise. It was
proposed that aircraft be distinguished by type, anticipating that one type 'vould be characteristically military
11nd another civil. It 'vas admitted that such distinctive
types had not yet evolved. It was also admitted that in
any attempt at lilnitation o:f air forces, it 'vould be difficult to detern1ine the potential air personnel and even
1nore difficult to determine air material in reserve. Much
difficulty was experienced in defining clearly the term
" in reserve." Some regarded material in reserve as
merely substitute 1naterial provided for emergency need
o:f aircraft in co1nmission; son1e would extend the idea
to cover material that could be mobilized in case o£ need
and others admitted that no satisfactory determination
-could be made. There were also n1any problems in Inarking off civil aviation undertakings from military and
strategic.
Draft 0 onvention, 1930.-The Draft Convention prepared by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarn1-
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antent Conference in referring to air arnuunent in article 28 e1nbodied the provision, "No preparations shall
be 1nade in civil aircraft in ti1ne of peace for the installation of \Varlike ar1na1nents for the purpose of conYerting such aircraft into 1nilitary aircraft." (League
of Nations, C. 4, ~1. 4, 1931, IX (C. P. D. ( 1)), p. G07.)
Other provisions \Vere also e1nbodied to distinguish 1nilitary and private aircraft. In the preli1ninary discussions of the coininission, how·ever, In any differences o:f
opinion 'vere manifest.
Application of rules.-Rules for land and 1nariti1ne
'varfare haYe beco1ne fairly \Yell established. It has
been argued that these so far as their principles are
applicable be extended to the air. So1ne of these rules
may doubtless be applicable. The follo,ving 1night be
in this category even i:f it afforded no final criteria for
op1n1on:
XIII,

HAGFE

COL\"YEXTIO~,

RIGHTS

AKD

Dl-TlES

OF

XEUTlL\L

l'U\\'ERS IN l\1AHITDIE ,Y_-\R

Art. 1. Belligerents are bound to respect the soYereign rigllts
of neutl'n I Power~, and to abstain, in neutral ten·itory or neutral
waters, frmn all acts which "-ouhl eonstitntE', on the pnrt of
the neutral Powers, which knowingly 11ermitted them. a nonfulfilment of their neutrality.

There has been 1nuch discussion as to 'vhether an aircraft is a n1eans of transportation and analogous to a
1nariti1ne Yessel or an instru1nent of 'var and analogous
to a projectile, i. e. a 'vinged intelligent projectile. In
any case it is an instru1nent in 'vhich the ti1ne and space
ele1nents in the region aboYe the earth "s surface have
been reduced to the 1ninin1u1n .
..t17nerican-Ger7nan correspondence, 1915.-0n January 19, 1915, the Ger1nan a1nbassador raised question
\Vith the Secretary of State as to the delivery o:f hydroaeroplanes by a neutral fir1n to a belligerent state. The
Ger1nan position "~as stated as :follo,vs:
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There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded as
war vessels \vhose delivery to belligerents states by neutrals
~hould be stot)l)ed under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention
of the Second Hague Conference of October 18, 1907. Hydroaeroplanes are not Inentioned by name in the convention simply
Leca use there was none in 1907 at the time of the conference.
( 1915, Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 777.)

To the letter o£ the Gern1an a1nbassador, Secretary of
State Bryan replied on January 29:
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your excellency's note of the 19th instant~ and in reply have to
inform you that the statements contained in your excellency's
note hnve receiYed my careful consideration in vie\v of the
earnest purpose of this GoYernment to perform every duty which
is imposed upon it as a neutral by treaty stipulation and international law.
The e:-:sential statement in your note, which implies an obligation on the part of this Government to interfere in the sale
and delivery of hydro-aeroplanes to belligerent powers, is:
.. There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded
as war Yessels whose deliYery to belligerent states by neutrals
should be stopped under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention of
the Second Hague Conference of O<.:tober 18, 1907."
As to thb ;tssertion of the character of hydro-aeroplanes I submit the following conunents: The fact that a hydro-aeroplane is
fitted with apparatus to rise fron1 and alight upon the sea does
not in my opinion give it the character of a vessel any n1ore than
the wheels attached to an aeroplane fitting it to rise from and
alight upon land give the latter the character of a land vehicle.
Both the hydro-aeroplane and the aeroplane are essentially aircraft; as an aid in military operations they can only be used in
the air. The fact that one starts its flight from the surface of
the sea and the other frOin the land is a mere inciclen t which in
no \Yay affects their aerial character.
In view of these fncts I n1ust dissent from your excellency's assertion that "there is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes 1nust be
regarded as war Yessels," and consequently I do not regard the
obligations imposed by treaty or by the accepted rules of international law applicable to aircraft of any sort.
In this connection I further call to your excellency's attention
that acconling to the latest advices received by this Department
the German Imperial Government include " balloons and flying
machines and their component parts" in the list of conditional
138120-32--2
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tontraband, an<l that in the Imperial prize ordinance, drafted
Septe1nber 30, 1909~, and issued in the Reichs-Gesetzblatt on Au·
.g ust 3, 1914, appear as conditional contraband " airships and flying machines" (Article 23, section 8). It thus appears that the
I1nperial Government have placed and still retain aircraft of all
descriptions in the class of conditional contraband, for which no
special treatment involving neutral duty is, so far as I am advised, provided by any treaty to which the United States is a
.signa tory or adhering power.
As in the views of this Departinent the provisions of Convention XIII of the Second Hague Convention do not apply to hydroaeroplanes I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question
.as to whether those provisions are in force during the present
war. (Ibid, p. 780.)

Neutrality proclamation, 1914.-Under accepted prin·ciples of international law a neutral state 1nay not directly or indirectly supply a belligerent with materials
.of 'var or allow its ports to be used as bases by bellig·erents.
Question has been raised as to whether supplies or
'var material purchased before the war and still within
neutral jurisdiction may be withdrawn by the bellig<erent during the war.
The proclamation of neutrality of the United States
in 1914 stated that'Vhereas the laws and treaties of the United States, without
"interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy,
or with the cmnmercial manufacture or sale of arms or muni.tions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be
-within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial
:neutrality during the existence of the contest;
And whereas it is the duty of a neutral government not to
~permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the
,purposes of war; * * *
r.rhe following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States,
to wit:
8. Fitting out and arming. or attemvting to fit out and arm,
ot· procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being con-cerned in the furnishing, fitting out. or arming of any ship or
vessel with intent that such ship or Yessel shall be employed in
:the service of either of the said belligerents. * * *

SUPPLIES FOR AIRCRAFT

13

10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or
nugmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting, the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed
Yessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States
was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed Yessel in the service of
either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects of
either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by
changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber.

'I'his proclamation also provided thatno ship of war or privateer of any belligerent shall be permitted
to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead, or other waters within
the jurisdiction of the United States as a station or place of resort
for any warlike purpose or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment; (1915, Naval 'Var College. International Law Topics, p. 7.)

'l'hese principles "\vould extend equally to aircraft or
other ne'v means of "\varfare.
Supplies.-It is evident that law relating to certain
) aspects of the rights and duties of states in the super. j acent air in the ti1ne of war is not yet ·clearly established. In 1nany phases there are possible analogies to
the principles of the la·w of n1ariti1ne and land warfare.
The fact that tilne and space are greatly reduced as
factors in move1nent of aerial 'varcraft as coin pared
with naval warcraft beco1nes a 1natter of great signifi-canc~. Some states have accordingly prohibited to nlilitary aircraft any entrance to their jurisdiction. It is
no'v a generally accepted principle that the belligerent
should not use and that the neutral should not permit
the use of its territory as a base. The fuel of an air-craft is at present a 1nost i1nportant element in its use.
·T o afford safe port for the exchange of a less service.able fuel for a n1ore serviceable fuel ·would not be merely
to render the aircraft airworthy, but would be perinitting the use of the airport as a base and should accordingly be forbidden by the neutral. In n1aritime 'var
:article 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention concerning the

f
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rights and duties of neutral po·wers in naval 'var applies
and is as follo·ws :
A neutral GoYernment is bound to employ the means at its
(li::-;posal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel witllin
its jurisdiction which it ha:-:; reason to belieYe is intended to
cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with
which that Government is at pe~ce. It is also bound to display
the same vigilance to 1n·event the <1epartnre from its jul'istliction
of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations,
which had been adapted entirel~· or partly within the said jurisdiet' on for use in war. (1908~ ~a val War College, International
Law Situations, p. 215.)

rrhe principles of this COllYention "·auld apply to aircraft 'Yithin neutral jnrisclictio9-:-i}
British-Dutch cOJ'Pespondence, 1916.-ln April, 1916,
a British seaplane 'Yhich fell W'ell out in the North Sea
"·as, 'vith its piloL picked up by a Dutch lugger and
taken to a Dutch port. 1'his event gave rise to considerable correspondence bet,yeen the Governn1ents of the
.parti-es concerned. Son1e of the correspondence stated
the official contentions .
. .<\.. men1oranchun of the British Foreign Office of
~fay 31, 1916, stated the G·overn1nent's position quite
fully, and is therefore given some,vhat at length:
A seaplane belonging to His :\faje::-;ty's forces was recently
olJliged on account of engine trouble to descend while over the
X orth Sea. The 11ilot was rescued by a Dutch fishing boat,
which took both hin1 and the seaplane into a Dutch port. The
XE'tllerlands Goveniment, though they have released the pilot,
apr1ear to consider it their duty to retain the seaplane for the
duration of the war. After a careful consideration of the
question, His :Majesty's Govenunent feel bound to dissent from
this view, and believe that the Netherlands Government are under
no obligation to intern the machine.
The Netherlands GoYernment, in releasing the pilot, appear to
haYe considered that he was in the same position as a n1ember
of a crew of a shitn\Teckell b~'ligerent warship who is })ieked
up by a neutral merchant Yessel and conveyed to a neutral port;
such a person, under the rules of The Hague Convention No. 10,
of 1907, is entitled to be released. His :L\Injesty's GoYenunent
believe their decision on tl1is point to be correct and consider

BRITISH-DUTCH POSITION"S, 1916

15

that, while none of the rules expre~sly laid down by international
law exaetly fit the case of the seaplane, a further exan1ination
of the principles which lie behind the rules \Yhich compel neutrals
to intern belligerent forces in certain circumstances shows that
the senplane should nlso he released.
The rules concerning internment are not based on any single
awl uniform principle. This fact exvlains itself when one
take~ iuto consideration that the~e rules ha Ye grown up graclua lly and seYerully and were, before the Peace Conference at
~rhe Ilngue in 1907, customarily :tgrced upon from different
moti n :•s. 'l'he consequenee is tlw t the rules governing internment lliffpr not only with regard to the internment of soldiers
on neutral law1 and internment of warships in neutral harbour~, hut also with regard to the internment of troops in general, an(1 the internment of such sollliers as hnYe escaped from
en pti ,.i ty.
One of tile basic reasons for the l'Ules concerning internment
i~ no llonbt the fact that a belligerent is entitled to insist that
such enemy forces as haYe crossed neutral territory for the purpose of escaping capture, shall not be ena hied to leave the neutral
territory, nnd again resort to hostilitie~. But this concerns only
enemy forces which ha ,.e deli hera tel,,· entered neutral territory
for tlte 11urpose of escaping capture: it cannot apply to such
enemy forces as for othe1· purpose~ cro~s into neutral territory, or e\·en cross accidentally without knowledge of the neutral
frontier. Now, all these n1ust likewi~e be interned, and the
hask reason for their internment i~ thn t, in ense these troops
are not interned, the other belligerent would be justified in
crossing into the neutral territory on hi~ part nn<l attacking
tlle enemy there.
As regnrds the internment of men-of-\Ynr, the basic reasons
are also manifold. One is-just a:;.: in tlte cnse of fugitiYe
troops-that a belligerent is entitled to insist that enemy Inenof-war which deliberately enter neutral harbours for the purIWSe of escaping capture, shall not after some length of thne
be allowed to lea Ye and resort to hostilities again, although they
may leaYe if they only stay twent~·-four hours. Other re~lsons
are that a neutral must not allow belligerent n1en-of-war to mal~e
his harbours the bnse of n1ilita ry operations, the bnse of supply
ueyonc1 a certain lin1it, the base for repairing vital damages,
and the like.
Considering that a neutral IH'e<l not intern soldiers who escape
from captivity, that he need not intern such sltipwrecked men as
ha ,.e been rescued by neutral merchantmen and brought to neutral
ports; that he need not intern such men-of-war as call at neutral
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harbours for legitimate purpo~es; and the like-there is without
doubt no general rule in existence which compels a neutral to intern in every case every member of belligerent forces who gets
on to its territory, and every man-of-war which comes into its
harbours. Each case must be decided according to its merits, and
there are different rules for the different cases.
It see1ns evident that the case of the seaplane which the Nether-·
lands Government is detaining is similar to the case of shipwrecked members of belligerent forces rescued by neutral ll1erchantmen. 'Vhereas, if such shipwrecked men are rescued by a
neutral 'varship, they must be interned according to article 13 of"
Convention No. 10 of The Hague, 1907, they need not be interned
if rescued by neutral merchantmen and brought to neutral bar-hours.
'Vhat are the basic reasons for this difference? That ship-wrecked men rescued by neutral men-of-war 1nust be interned isobvious, because thes·e men have been saved from drowning, and
perhaps from capture, by getting on neutral territory-a neutral
man-of-war is neutral territory-and they can as little be allowed
to go back to their own country as members of belligerent forcesin land warfare who escaped being captured or killed by crossinginto neutral territory. On the other hand, if they are rescued by
neutral merchantmen they do not thereby come into neutral territory, for neutral merchantmen are not, as _neutral men-of-warare, neutral territory, and any enemy warship n1ay demand that
the rescued n1en be handed oYer to her. Further, the rescuingneutral merchantmen may as well take the rescued tnen into a port
of their own country as to a neutral port; it is a mere accident
if the rescued tnen are taken into a neutral port instead of into a
port of their own country, and for this reason they need not be
interned if they are brought into a neutral port.
It may be argued that, in case she does not intern the rescued
seaplane, Holland would Yiolnte her neutrality and render assistance to Great Britain by allolving the latter to recover a seaplane which were othenvise lost. However, the assistance, if
any, rendered by the release of the seaplane would not be greater·
than the assistance, if any, to a belligerent comprised in the permission, which according to existing law may be given to escaped
prisoners of war, and to prisoners brought by troops taking refuge
on neutral territory, to leaYe such territory with the consequence
that they will eventually rejoin the armed forces of their country.
And why should the release of the British seaplane be an unneutral act, whereas the release of ller airman, wlliclt has actuall~
taken place, is not? If tl1is airman was allo\\-ell to return with.
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the consequence of eventually joining the British forces again,
why should not the same be allowed to his seaplane?
Lastly, it ought to be taken into consideration that none of the·
enumerated basic reasons for the duty of neutrals to intern belligerent forces can be made use of in favour of internment of
the rescued seaplane. The seaplane did not go to Holland for·
the purpose of escaping capture, or for the purpose of taking in
supplies, or for the purpose of undergoing repairs. In fact, itcUd not get there voluntarily and on its own account, but quite
accidentally, because the rescuing 1nerchantman might as well
have taken it to an English as to a Dutch port.
It must also be remembered that if the seaplane had been
left at sea it might have been salved by ·His Majesty's Government, or by a British ship and taken to a British port. The·
pilot could speak no Dutch, and the skipper of the fishing boat
which rescued him could not speak English, so that the pilot was
unable to give any directions or express any wish with regard
to the disposal of the se-aplane. (Parliamentary Papers, l\Iisc.
No.4 (1918) [Cd. 8983], p. 3.)

Referring to this matter in a communication of July
11, 1916, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs.
said:
Your Excellency points out to me that the case of war material salYed on the high seas is analogous to that of the shipwrecked belligerent combatant. I feel I must, however, point
out to your Excellency that the a:qalogy between these two cases·
is only apparent. International law has defined the treatment of
combatants rescued on the high seas by a neutral vessel and·
disembarked in a neutral port. It has sought to safeguard personal
liberty as far as possible,· and bas established that, only in thecase of rescue by a neutral warship (which is considered to form
part of the territory of the country) should the shipwrecked·
person necessarily be interned. This consideration did not arise
in the case of material salved on the high seas. In the absence·
of any ruling in this connection, the neutral Governments are
then called upon to retain, until the end of the war, n1aterial
salved by a vessel of their nationality, whether warship o1··
merchant-vessel.
It is true that, by leaving at liberty the belligerent combatant
brought in by a merchant vessel, the neutral Government enables·
him to take up arms again, but, just as in the case, quoted by
rour Excellency, of escaped prisoners of war, regard for personal
liberty does not permit of his being interned, unless the rules
of international law expressly impose this restriction.
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In Yiew of the consitlerations set forth aboYe, I belieYe that
your I<Jxcellency'H GoYernment ·will surely recogni~e that the
Queen's GoYernment, while regretting their inability to accede
to the wishes of the British Government, would be acting in
contradiction to the principles which haYe till now guided them
in the obselTation of nPutrality were they to restore Sub-Lieutenant Beare's sear1lane before the end of the war. (Ibid., p. 6.)

Eritislz-Dutch correspondence, 1917.-Later in Septeinber, 1917, another British seaplane 'vhich can1e do,Yn
in open sea 'Yas tow·ecl 'vith t'vo occupants to a Dutch
port. The occupants 'Yere released but the seaplane w·as
detained. A note 'vas sent by the British ~linister at
'fhe Hague to the Dutch Foreign Office in 'vhich it w·as
said:
A fresh case has now arisen in the case of a British seaplane,
No. 1,232, manned by Flight-Lieutenant Hopcroft and Petty
Officer Garner, which can1e clo\Vn on the high seas on the 23rd
September some 60 miles fron1 the Dutch coast, ·was rescued by
a Dutch fishing vessel, and towed into the Helder, wllere the
machine is no\v detained, although the occupants haYe been
released in accordance with the accepted tenets of international
Jaw.
I would beg to remind your Excellency that it was stated in Sir
A. .Johnstone's note of the lOth Reptember, 1916, that His
1\lajesty's GoYernment n1aintains that the rule by which ship\Vrecked co1nbatants brought into a neutral port by neutral merchant vessels are released ap11lies equally to the case of war
material belonging to a belligerent which is brought into a neutral
port by a neutral n1erchant ship. This contention is still maintained by His l\Iajesty's GoYernment, and I have therefore to
request that the Netherlands GoYernment will order the release
of the airship in (tuestion, n~ well as of tlw t wllich cante clown la~t
year with Lieutenant Beare on board.
In the course of a recent conversation, I understood your
Excellency to be sOinewhat doubtful as to whether the decision
of the Netherlands Government in the case of such aircraft
brought in by a neutral vessel was undeniably good in law, but
I gathered that ;vou are of opinion that such a decision once
taken cannot be reversetl. I would venture with great respect
to point out to your Excellency that such an attitude is equivalent to contending that two wrongs can 1nake a right-a contention which I feel sure your Excellency \Yill realise, on reflection,
cannot be justifiably maintained as a reason for continuing to
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i utern aircraft that would appear to be as clearly entitled to·

release as the officers who manned them.
Your Excellency, in the -course of the conver~aeon to which
allusion is n1ade aboYe, stated that ~'OU had reason to think that
the rule applied in the case of these British airships had also
been enforced in connection ·with other belligerent machines. It
would be of great interest to my GoYernment to possess details
of such instances, and I should therefore be greatly obliged if
your Excellency would be so good as to furnish me with the sa1ne.
(Ibid., p. 1~.)

In again declining to accept the British vie'v, the
J)utch ~Iinister of Foreign Affairs gave a long argunlent in the course of which he said:
It goes without saying that if an analogous case concerning
one of the adYersaries of Great Britain were to arise, for ex~nn
llle, if a German dirigible were brought into Holland in similar
circumstances, the Queen's Government ·would in the same way
not think of restoring it before the end of the war. I venture
to make this apparently superfluous remark in order to show
tlwt, if the Queen's Government were to accer>t the British
GoYernment's point of view, they would be obliged in such circumstances to restore those engines of wnr to the Government
to which they belong innnediately on their arrival on Netherlands
territon·. As to ships of war, in view of the special stipulations of international law with regard to them, they can only
be ~ubjected to this same treatment in the case of their being
found at sea deserted by their crews; if, on the contrary, the
crew is still on board, while the ship has sustained dan1age
and is tl'ying to tnake a neutral port to effect repairs, the Queen's
Govenunent will have to decide whether the principle expressed
in article 17 of the 13th Convention requires the release of the
ship and her crew. (Ibid., p. 16.)

The British Govern1nent again rene\-ved its contention
in a note of Decen1ber 21, 1917.
9. The Netherlands Government base their refusal to restore
to His :\Iajesty's Government the articles detained on the gen
eral ground that there is no rwecise rule covering the question
of their proper treatment, and that their restoration would
be an act reinforcing the armed strength of a belligerent, and
therefore contrary to neutrality. The argument is supported,
in the eyes of the Netherlands Government, by article 6 of the·
13th Hague Convention, which forbids the direct or indirect
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s upply of war material by a neutral Government to a belligerent.
It is contended that the liberation of the crews of the seaplanes
referred to above was prescribed by a definite rule of international law overriding the general prohibition against strengthening a belligerent's military strength; this rule cannot, according to the Netherlands Government, be applied by analogy to
the articles rescued at the same time or in similar circunlstances, because the general prohibition which they conceive to
necessitate the action which they have taken 1nust hold good
unless explicitly overridden.
10. In all the cases enumerated above, with the exception of
the seaplane rescued by the Norwegian steamship Orn, Dutch
subjects have-so far as is known, unasked-taken possession of
the property of His Majesty's Government on the high seas and
.carried it into Netherlands jurisdiction. On requesting the restoration of the property thus gratuitously taken from them, His
Majesty's Government are met '\Vith the excuse that to release
the articles would be to add to the armed strength of Great Britain, and would therefore be contrary to the neutrality of the
Netherlands. The practical effect of such a ruling is that Dutch
seamen who, from motives of hu1nanity, rescue wrecked British
.airmen and their machines, becon1e-no doubt entirely contrary
to their wishes or their expectations-instrumental in dilninishing
the armed strength of Great Britain. In the worst case noted
(that in which a machine-gun and other gear was re1noved from a
seaplane by the crew of the Noord-Hinder lightship, who 'vere
Netherlands Government servants), it is difficult to perceive much
difference between such conduct and the misappropriation of goods
'vhich becomes the subject of criminal proceedings. Yet the restoration of the articles thus taken is refused on the ground of neutrality.
11. The Netherlands Government contend that, if it 'vere not for
the existence of an express provision of international law overTiding the general rule, they would be obliged by the prohibiiit)n
.against adding to the armed strength of a belligerent to intern
the cre"\vs of belligerent warships or aircraft rescued and brought
to the Netherlands by neutral merchant ships. It must be relnarked that, if this general prohibition really had the effect pret ended, it could scarcely be overridden without a definite regulation laying down in terms that such crews were not to be int erned. No such positive regulation exists. The rule under which
persons in the above position are released is tnerely mentioned, as
it were in passing, in the report of the Drafting Committee on
':rhe Hague Convention for the adaptation- of the principles of the
Geneva ConYention to lVIaritime ",.arfare. It is evidrnt that it is
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uot a rule overriding a wider princir1le, but is one recognised us
flowing naturally from the general principles which govern the
question of the internment of belligerent persons and war material
by neutral Powers. Those general principles apply equally to
persons and to material by analogous circumstances, and this fact
is not altered by the chance that the case of combatants rescued
by neutral merchant ships is n1entionecl in the report on the lOth
Hague Convention, while no allusion to the case of material in
a similar position occurs in an equally authoritative document.
12. As regards the reference made by the Netherlands Governtnent to the terms of article 6 of the 13th Hague Convention, His
l\lajesty's Government can only express astonishment at being
asked to consider such an argu1nent. The article refers to the
supply by a neutral to a belligerent Power of war material owned
by the neutral, and has no wider scope. Furthermore, it must be
<>bserved that the seaplanes and other articles now in question
would never have cmne into the possession of the Netherlands
Government at all if they had been left alone by the Dutch subjects who brought them into the Netherlands ports. There could
haYe been no question of the Government furnishing any of the
articles to His :Majesty's Government had they simply refrained
from ilnpounding goods which no rule of international law required the1n to seize.
13. I request that you will address a note in the above sense
to the Netherlands :Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that
His :l\Iajesty's Government is unable to perceive any force in the
arguments by which he seeks to defend the action of his Government, and at the same time reiterate the request for the release
and return of the articles in question. (Ibid., p. 17.)

Son1e of this correspondence sho,vs the effect of the
strain of war in an attempt .to obtain from a neutral all
possible concessions in the 'vay of favorable treatment on
the one hand and of an attempt to avoid all possible coinplications to 'vhich a neutral n1ight be exposed on the
other. Possibly the hope of salvage money 1nay also
sti1nulate a private neutral vessel to bring in a disabled
aircraft found on the sea.
Transformation. of civil aircraft.-In 1919 the Supren1e Council of the Peace Conference proposed to the
Aeronautical Con1mission a1nong others the follo,ving
question : " Can civil aeroplanes and airships be easily
transfor1ned into 'veapons of 'Yar? " The aeronautical
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commtssion 1nade up of technical representatives from
the United States~ the J3ritish En1pire, I~"'rance, Italy,
Japan, Belgitun, Brazil~ Cuba, Greece, Portugal, RuInania and Serb-Croa t-SloYene States, after consideration, replied unanin1onsly ~ ·· Yes, con11nercial aeroplanes
and airships can be Yery easily and quickly transfonned
into 'veapons of 'var."
CeneT·al princ-iples~ J,919.-'fhe c1egrees to \vhich the
principles of regulation of aYiation had advanced is eYident in the discussions prelin1inary to the negotiation of
the treaty of peace and the conYention relating to international air navigation in 1919. On April 7, 1919, the
following 'vas approYecl by the 1\_eronautical Con11nisSlOll:
LIST OF PHINCIPLES SET'T LED BY THE CO)[.MISSION :FOR THE PURPOSE
OF GUIDING THE SUBC<HDIITTEES IN THEIR ".,. ORK

1. RecogniUon( 1) Of the principle of tl1e full antl absolute soYereignty of
each State oYer the air a uoYe its territories and territorial \Ya ters,
carrying with it the t•ight of exclusion of foreign aircraft:
(2) Of the right of eneh State to impose its jurisdiction oYer
the air aboYe its territory and terr~torial waters.
2. Subject to the principle of so,,·ereignty, recognition of the desirability of the greate~t freedom of international air naYigation
in so far as this freetlon1 is consistent with the security of the
State, with the enforcen1ent of reasonable regulations relatiYe to
the admission of aircraft of the contracting States and with the
domestic legislation of the State.
3. 'Vith regard to domestic regulations relatiYe to the admission and treat1nent of the aircraft of the contracting States,
recognition of the principle of the absence of all discrim:nation
on the ground of nationalit~·.
4. 'l~l1e recognition of the principle . that eYery aircraft !nust
posse8s the nationality of one contracting State only and that
eYery aircraft 1nust be entered upon the register of the contracting State the nationalit;\' of which it possesses.
G. Tl1e following proYisions are recognized as desirable fro1n
an international point of Yie\Y to insure the safe con<luct of
aerial navigation:
(i) Regulations for cOinpulsory certificates of airworthiness
a nd lic('nses for wireless equipment, at least for aircraft used
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t\)r ~ommercial punlOses. :\Iutual recognition of these certificates and 1:eenses by the contracting States.
( ii) Hegulations for compulsory licenses of pilots and other
per~onnel in charge of aircraft.
~Iutual recognition of these
licenses by the contracting States.
(iii) International rules of the air, including international
rules as to signals, lights, and for the prevention of collisions.
R(logulations for landing and on the ground.
G. Hecognition of the principle of special treatment for milital'y,
nantl, and State aircraft when they are in Government Service.
7. Hecognition of tile right of tran~it without landing for
interim tional traftic uetween two points outside the territory of
a contracting State, subject to the right of the State traversed
to re~ervc to it:·~elf its own iutel'ual con1mercial aerial traffic
and to eompel landing of auy aircraft flying over it by 1ueans
of av1n·opriate signal:.;.
8. Hecognition of the right of use. by the aircraft of all the
contrading States, of all vuhlic nero<lromes upon the principle
that ~harges for landing facilities should be imposed without
discrimination on the ground of na tionalits.
9. Recognition of tile vrincip1e of ·mutual indemnity between
the contracting States to coYer d;nwtge llone to 11erson or property iu one State hy Go,·ernment aircraft of another State.
10. Hecognition of the necessity of a per1nanent International
.Aei"OlW uj:ical Commission.
11. Hecognitiou of the obligation of each contracting State
to giYe e1te(·t to the provisions of the eonYention by its domestic legislation.
12. Recognition of the r>rinciple that the convention does not
affe~t the rights aiHl dutie~ of belligerents or neutrals in time
of war. (Commission de l'Aeronnutique. p. 18.)

Questions in II ouse of (/onnnons.-Soine of the rescues
of the cre,Ys of sub1narines ga Ye rise to questions in regard to their treatn1ent by neutrals. In the House of
Con11nons, January 13, 191G:
1\Ir. Swift 1\lacNeill asked the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether the crew of the British submarine which sank
off Texel on the 6th instant, having :-:prung a leak and grounded,
who were rescued by a Dutch cruiser and ·brought into Helder,
have been interned at Groningen by the Dutch Government;
whether, ha,·ing regard to the fact that the British submarine
whose -crew were thus rescued was not sunk by a belligerent, the
detention or internment of that ere"· by the Dutch Govennnent
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is contrary to the principles and practice of international law;
whether Article 13 of Convention X, of the Second Peace Conference, providing that if shipwrecked sailors are tnken on
board a neutral man-of-war precaution must be taken so far as
possible that they do not again take part in the operations of
the war, applies only to sailors whose ·ships have been 'vrecked
by the enen1y, not to sailors whose ships have been 'vrecked
in the ordinary course of navigation; and whether Great Britain
will demand the immediate release from detention of these
sailors, whose case does not differ from that of any other British
subjects in neutral territory, and who should, even if their ship
had been disabled by a belligerent, as in the case of the Russian
sailors rescued by British, French, and Italian cruisers from
ships disabled by the Japanese, be not detained but handed over
to Great Britain on the condition that they should not take part
in hostilities during the 'Var?
Sir E. GREY. The crew of the E 17 has been interned by the
Dutch Government, but the place of internment is as yet unknown to His Majesty's Government.
The answer to the second part of the question is that Article
13 of Convention X of The Hague draws no distinction between
ships wrecke<l by the enen1y or in the ordinary course of na viga tion. As to the remainder of the bon. 1\iember's question, I
\Viii see that the suggestions and arguments put forward by him
are very carefully considered. (Parliamentary Debates, Comnlons, 1915-1916, Vol. LXXVII, p. 1743.)

, Repairing in neutral port.-Authorities are bound in
general by the obligation to use due diligence that the
port shall not become a base, and by previous principles
and practice of Great Britain. T'his obligation to use
due diligence is en1bodied in the provisions of the treaty
of \Vashington, 1871, 'vhich states, in Article VI:
A neutral Government is boundFirst, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming,
or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on
war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use
like diligence to prev~nt the departure from its jurisdiction of
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such
\·essel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within
such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
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Secondly, not to permit· or suffer either belligerent to 1nake
use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against
the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of
military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.
'l'hirdly, to exercise clue diligence in its own ports and waters,
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

After 1871 these principles 'vere generally a pprovecl.
In 1907 at The Hague Conference, Great Britain proposed as a basis for a rule:
A neutral State must not knowingly permit a warship of a
belligerent to repair within its jurisdiction the injuries resulting
from a combat with the enemy, nor in any case to make repairs
in excess of what will be necessary for navigating.

Japan 1nade a similar proposal.
After much discussion a provision in regard to repairs was embodied as article 17 of the Thirteenth Convention on Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime 'V ar,
as follows:
In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may only
carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render them
seaworthy, and may not add in any n1anner whatsoever to their
fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power shall
decide ·what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried out
with the least possible delay.

1"'he British, 'vhile objecting to so1ne articles of this
conYention, regarded this article 17 as a fair statement
0f the existing law.
The ~·Glasgow,~' 1911,.-In the Battle of Coronel bet,yeen the British and Gern1an fleets off the 'vest coast
of Chile on N oYeinber 1, 1914, tw·o British vessels ".,.ere
sunk and others "-ere da1naged. T'he cruiser Glasgo -w
\Yas reported to have received five holes fro1n Gennan
shell fire. The Glasgow ste~uned under orders a ,vay
fro1n the a.rea of battle, passed through the Straits of
)!agellan~ and on X oYeinber 20, 'vas reported as repairing at Rio de ,Janeiro.
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THE "GLASGOW" A T HIO

RI<:PORTED SHARE IN ACTION OFF CHILE

(From our correspondent)

NEw YonK , Xor. 20.
The Brazilian Goverrnnent has given IJermission for the British
c ruiser Glasgow to enter the dry dock at Hio de .Janeiro to n1ake
urgent repairs. The Glctsgow, according to dispatches published
in the American Press, has five holes in her hull from shell fire.
Four of her crew were wounded in the battle off Chile.
Officers of the Glasgow are quoted as saying that at the outset
of the battle Admiral Cradock from the flagship Goocl Hope,
ordered the Glasgow and Otranto, in view of the higher power
of the Gennan squadron's guns, to seek a place of refuge. Notwithstanding this order the Glasgow answered the German fire.
In the first few minutes of the fight, the officers of the Glasgow
are stated to have said the Good Hope had one of her two 9-2. in.
guns dismantled and her n1agazine ·exploded. Admiral Cradock
and the crews of the Good H 01Je and ][ omnouth, it is believed,
went down with their ships. The battleship Canopus, according
to the story attributed to the officers of the Glctsgow, steaming
only 16 knots, could not arrive in time to participate in the
fight. .
The Brazi1inn Govennnent has given the Glctsgow seven days
in which to tnake the necessary repairs. (London Times,
Nov. 21, 1914.)

Later, the Glasgo1v took part in the battle off the
Falkland Islands, December 8, 1914.
The " Geier" and the '~ Locksun."-On October 28,
1914, the British ainbassador raised the question of detaining the Geier, a vessel or \Yar of Gerinany, and the
Locksun, a vessel belonging to the North '3-erinan Lloyd
Co., vvhich had entered the port of Honolulu. On the
saine date, the Japanese an1bassador raised the question
in regard to the intentions of the United States in regard
to the Geie1".
On the saine clay, the Secretary of State received froin
the Treasury Departinent a report from the Collector of
·( Justoms at Honolulu, as follo,vs:
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HoNoLULU, Oct. 27, 1914-10.15 p. m.
On October 15 captain German gunboat Geier requested permission to make repairs to render vessel seaworthy and estimated
time for same at one week. On October 20 Naval Constructor
Furer, at my reque~t, examined the vessel and recommended that
time be extended eight days from 20th to place boilers in sea worthy
condition. To-day consul requests from eight to ten days more in
which to make repairs to steam and feed piping and boilers that
have been found to be leaking. Consul states captain has used
every effort to finish repairs, working Sundays and overtime, but
owing to lack of labor can not finish in less time. Naval Constructor Furer has just completed another examination of the
vessel and reports that he is unable to state how long repairs
should take, as more leaky tubes may be found as work progresses.
Honolulu iron works estimates time for repairs at from two to
three 'veeks, which, in opinion of Furer, is a conservative minimum. Furer reports piping and boilers in bad condition; may
possibly take further time to repair. Await instructions.
(American Journal International Law, 1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 242.)

On October 30, 1914, the Counselor o:f the Department o:f State sent the :following to the German ambassador in regard to the Geier.·
DEPARTMENT OF . STATE,

TVashington, October 30, 1914.

l\ly Dear l\Ir. Ambassador: The Department has been advised
that the Gennan gunboat Geier put into the port of Honolulu,
and on October 15 the captain requested pennission to make repairs to render the vessel seaworthy, and estimated the time for
this work to be one week. The naval constructor of the United
States at the port of Honolulu examined the vessel on October
20, and recommended that the time be extended eight days,
from October 20, in order to place the boilers in a seaworthy
condition. On October 27, the German consul at that port requested from eight to ten days additional time in which to make
repairs to steam and feed piping and boilers that have been
found to be in a leaking condition. Upon a further examination, the United States naval constructor reports that he is unable to state how long repairs should take, as conditions requiring remedy may be found as 'vork progresses. It is also
reported that, on accoun~ of the generally bad condition of the
piping and boilers, further time may be required to complete all
repairs.
138120-32--3
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The circumstances in this case point to the gunboat Ge·ier as
a ship that at the outbreak of war finds iself in a more or less
broken-down condition and on the point of undergoing general
repairs, but still able to keep the sea. In this situation the
Government belie·v es that it does not comport with a strict
neutrality or a fair interpretation of the Hague Conventions, to
allow such a vessel to complete unlimited repairs in a United
States port. The Government therefore has instructed the authorities to notify the captain of the Geier that three weeks from
October 15 will be allowed the Geier for repairs, and that if she
is not able to leave American waters by November 6, the United
States will feel obliged to insist that she be interned until the
expiration of the war. (Atnerican Journal International Law,
1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 243.)

Later, a communication was sent in regard to the
Locksun:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

1-Vashington, November "1, 1914.

l\ly Dear l\lr. Ambassador: Referring to my previous communication to you of October 30 regarding the internment of the German cruiser Geier, the Department is now in possession of information that the German steamship Loeksun, belonging to the
Norddeutscher Lloyd Company, cleared August 16, 1914, frmn
Manila with 3,215 tons of coal for lVIenado, in the Celebes; that
she coaled the German warship Geiler in the course of her voyage
toward Honolulu, where she arrived soon after the Geier; that
the Looksun received coal by transfer from another vessel somewhere between Manila and Honolulu, and that the captain stated
that he had on board 245 or 250 tons of coal when he entered
Honolulu, whereas investigation showed that he had on board
approximately 1,600 tons.
From these facts the Department is of the opinion that the
operations of the Looksun constitute her a tender to the Geier,
and that she n1ay be reasonably so cons~dered at the present time.
This Governtnent is, therefore, under the necessity of according
the Looksun the same treabnent as the Geier, and has taken steps
to have the vessel interned at Honolulu if she does not leave immediately. (American Journal of International Law, 1915, Spec.
Sup. 9, p. 245.)

To this action the German ambassador took exception,
and later the Secretary of State replied :
In the circumstances of this case, as known by the Department,
it is obliged to state that it still adheres to its previous position
that the status of the Loeksun as a tender to the ship of war
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Geier was sufficiently proved to justify her treatment as such.

In this connection the Department has the honor to call to your
attention the following quotation from the award of the Alabama Claims Commission, which seems to establish this principle regarding the treatment of tenders, although the application of this statement was not made to the exact circumstances
of the Locksun case:
"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Tuscaloosa
(tender to the Alaba;rna), the Clarence, the Taeony, and the
Archer (tenders to the Florrida), the tribunal is unanimously of
opinion that such tenders or auxiliary vessels, being properly
regarded as accessories, must necessarily follow the lot of their
principals and be submitted to the same decision which applies
to them respectively."
The entire practice of the internment of vessels appears to
be of recent origin. The doctrine of internment \Vas apparently
first applied to any gre~t extent during the Russo-Japanese war,
and it is believed that the treatment of the Locksun is in keeping with the high standard of neutrality upon which the doctrine
of internment is based. The Department is not aware that measures to preserve neutrality are entirely dictated by precedent and
international law, and it believes that belligerents hardly have
proper cause to question an attitude on neutrality justly in
advan~e of precedent and international law if it is applied by
the neutral impartially to all belligerents. As to the advisibility
of assuming such an attitude, the Department is impressed with
the proposition that the neutral and not the belligerent is the
proper judge in the circumstances. (American Journal International Law, 1915, Spec. Sup. 9, p. 251.)

Spaight's opinion.-J. M. Spaight, "\vho has written
much upon various phases of air law, says particularly
of the situation at the end of the World War regarding
belligerent aircraft salvaged by neutral private vessels:
The law upon the point-indeed, upon the whole question of
belligerent air entry-was unsettled, but a rule was being created
by practice, and to allow exceptions from it was unwise. Save
when allocated to, and in contact with, a warship, which, itself
for some purposes the "territory" of its State, may be regarded
as imparting its own character to an aircraft carried upon it
or lashed to it, belligerent military aircraft brought into neutral
jurisdiction under whatever circumstances should, it is submitted, be subject to the one universal and inelastic rule that
they must be detained by the neutral authorities. Relax that
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rule and the door opens to a host of possible exceptions and
complications. (Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, p. 438.)

\ I nternment.-ln general, aircraft and their personnel
entering neutral jurisdiction during the vVorld 'Var
were interned. This was the case whether the aircraft
entered in distress or flew within neutral jurisdiction.
Sometimes aircraft flying 'vithin neutral jurisdiction
'vere brought down by gunfire as was the case in Switzerland and the Netherlands. It made no difference even
i£ an aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction in error supposing it was still in belligerent territory. Sometimes
notification was given by signal, rocket, or in some other
manner, but absence o£ notification was not a ground £or
exemption £rom liability.
There is no reason vvhy belligerent aircraft should,
within neutral jurisdiction, receive any more favorable
treatment than that extended to naval craft, and as the
risks following entrance are greater, the accepted doctrine is that belligerent military aircraft may not enter
neutral jurisdiction and the rules proposed by the commission o£ jurists at The Hague in 1923 imposed duties
upon the neutral.
Article 42. A neutral Government must use the means at its
disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent
military aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have
entered such jurisdiction.
A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is with1u its jurisdiction after having alighted, for any reason whatsoever, together
\vith its crew and the passengers, if an~... ~}924, Naval 'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 1~

The commission o£ jurists in 1923 referred to article
15 o£ the 1907 Hague Convention £or the Adaptation to
Naval War o£ the Principles o£ the Geneva Convention
which provided thatThe shipwrecked, sick, or wounded, who are landed at a neutral
port with the consent of the local authorities, must, unless an
a rrange1nent is made to the contrary between the neutral State
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and the belligerent States, be guarded by the neutral State so as
to prevent them again taking part in the operations of the War.
The expenses of tending them in hospital and interning them
shall be borne by the State to which the shipwrecked, sick, or
'vounded persons belong. (1908, Naval \Var College, International Law Situations, p. 207.)

The proposed rules in 1923 extended this principle
of internment to persons brought in upon a neutral military aircraft in article 43 as :follows :
The personnel of a disabled belligerent military aircraft rescued outside neutral waters brought into the jurisdiction of a
neutral State by a neutral military aircraft and there landed
shall be interned. (1924, Naval \Var College, International Law
Documents, p. 134.)

Practice in the World War was to release airmen
rescued by nonmilitary craft whether air or marine
when the airmen 'vere brought within neutral jurisdiction. "\Vhether belligerent airmen rescued by public
neutral nonmilitary craft should be released is still
somewhat uncertain but as the public neutral craft,
e. g. a royal neutral yacht, would be exempt :from visit
and search, it would seem that rescued airmen should be
liable to the sa1ne treatment when entering the neutral
port as 'vhen rescued by a neutral vessel of war. The
rescue of air1nen and aircraft by neutral private vessels
during the World War seems to have been :followed by
release of airmen and internment of the aircraft.
Seaplane rescue and repairs.-It is generally admitted
that a neutral should conduct itself in a humane manner
toward belligerents and that such conduct toward one
belligerent can not be regarded by the other as un:friendly. The seaplane when upon the surface of the
water is according to the decisions of courts to be treated
as a seacraft would be treated and incurs the same liabilities. The shipwrecked personnel of a belligerent vessel of war rescued by a neutral are to be treated according to the provisions of article 15 of the Convention :for the Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles
of the Geneva Convention.
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While a naval vessel which is within a harbor in 'vhich
24-hour sojourn is permitted, may 'vithin the period
make repairs necessary to render the vessel seaworthy if
it enters under its own power, if the neutral brought the
disabled vessel in from the high sea, the vessel should be
interned. This principle should be applied even more
strictly to a seaplane. The Commission of Jurists in
1923 in its report proposing article 42 said :
The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern coYers
not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. The obligation is not affected by the circumstances which led to the
military aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies
whether the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction,
voluntary or involuntarily, an'd whatever the cause. It is an
obligation owed to the opposing belligerent and is based upon
the fact that the aircraft has come into an area where it is not
subject to attack by its opponent.
The only exceptions to the obligation to intern an aircraft are
those arising under articles 17 and 41. The first relates to flying
ambulances. Under the second, an aircraft on board a warship is deemed to be part of her, and therefore will follow the
fate of that warship if she enters neutral ports or waters. If
she enters under circumstances which render her immune from
internment, such aircraft will likewise escape internment.
The obligation to intern belligerent military aircraft entering neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern the
personnel. These will in general be combatant members of the
belligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown
that in tilne of war military aeroplanes are employed for transporting passengers. As it may safely be assumed that in time
of war a passenger would not be carried on a belligerent military aircraft unless his journey was a matter of importance
to the Government, it seems reasonable also to comprise such
passengers in the category .of persons to be interned. (1924,
Naval War College, International Law Docurnents, p. 133.)
SOLUTION

(a) The govern1nent of State Z should deny the request of the commander of the dirigible of the air
forces of State X to replace the hydrogen by helium.
(b) The government of State Z should intern the
sea plane and its personnel.

